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The decoy effect in relative performance evaluation and the debiasing role of DEA 
 
1 Introduction 
Despite being described as a discipline aiming at facilitating decision making, operations 
research (OR) has largely omitted behavioral issues. Most recently, this deficit has been 
addressed by Hämäläinen et al. (2013). They comprehensively discuss the high potential of 
behavioral OR for advancing the practical benefit of normative OR methods and propose nine 
topics for a respective research agenda. The present paper refers particularly to the topic of 
behavioral/cognitive aspects, since it stresses performance evaluation biases related to the so-
called decoy effect. 
The decoy effect is a special kind of context effect, which refers to the influence that 
contextual variables have on decision making. Overwhelming evidence exists demonstrating 
that context is likely to influence performance evaluation (see, e.g., Damisch et al., 2006; 
Page & Page, 2010). For example, evaluators’ preferences are biased not only by the past 
performance of the decision making unit (DMU), but also by the performance of other DMUs 
under analysis. With regard to the latter aspect, the decoy effect implies that the inclusion of a 
dominated alternative – the decoy – can influence the choice between the non-dominated 
alternatives. Concretely, the probability of preferring the target alternative, which is the non-
dominated option that is most similar to the decoy, may increase. The existence of this effect 
has repeatedly been confirmed by research on consumer behavior, showing that customers 
tend to prefer the target alternative (Ariely, 2009; Huber et al., 1982; Wedell & Pettibone, 
1996). 
The research settings used for studying consumer behavior strongly resemble relative 
performance evaluation cases where alternatives are compared on a utility function level. 
Furthermore, these research settings are constructed in a way that they differentiate between 
non-dominated (i.e., efficient) and dominated (i.e., inefficient) units like in the context of data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). Against this background, two questions arise: (i) does the decoy 
effect also occur in cases where the relative performance of alternatives is evaluated, and (ii) 
to what extent can the application of DEA – namely the incorporation of respective efficiency 
scores and the mention of existing slacks – act as a debiasing tool? 
To shed light on these questions, we conducted a vignette-based experiment with bachelor 
students taking management control and business accounting courses. For analyzing whether 
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relative performance evaluation may also be affected by a decoy effect, the well-known 
experimental setting from the area of consumer behavior was adapted to the performance 
context. The results show that adding a dominated DMU to the set of DMUs augments the 
attractiveness of the target DMU. Therefore, a decoy effect can be observed when DMUs are 
compared against each other. 
In a second step, the role of reporting DEA results as a debiasing procedure for the identified 
decoy effect was considered. Participants in the corresponding treatments were provided with 
additional information about DEA efficiency scores and slacks. The results indicate that the 
scores discriminating between efficient and inefficient DMUs can significantly reduce the 
decoy effect in a relative performance evaluation context. The mention of the existence of 
slacks for distinguishing between strong and weak efficient DMUs also contributes to 
avoiding the decoy effect, but it is associated to unexpected effects, such as the increment of 
the proportion of participants choosing the dominated alternative as the best performing one. 
An additional experiment was conducted to evaluate whether this unexpected effect was due 
to a negative formulation of the meaning of the slacks. The results show that a positive 
explanation of the slacks does not affect the percentage of participants considering the 
dominated DMU as the best performing one. This suggests that further research for 
understanding the interpretation and use of the slacks information should be conducted. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 depicts the theoretical background of 
our research, outlining the decoy effect in choice tasks as well as the basic aspects of relative 
performance evaluation with DEA. The hypotheses are derived in Section 3, and the method 
to investigate these hypotheses is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results of the 
study, addressing the decoy effect on the one side and the potential of DEA as a debiasing 
mechanism on the other side. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Motivation 
2.1 Managerial issues related to performance evaluation and the role of DEA 
Performance has been defined as a social construct that acquires its meaning within a 
decision-making context. It is a complex concept that refers not only to the actions performed, 
but also to their results in comparison to benchmarks. Without such a comparison, it is almost 
impossible to qualify performance as good or bad. The inherent complexity of the performance 
concept is augmented by the fact that each decision maker may interpret performance data 
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differently (Lebas & Euske, 2007). To this respect, research is limited and little is known 
about the information which managers use and the way they process it (Neely, 2007). 
Traditional performance measurement systems (PMS) were based on financial measures and 
fixed benchmarks, but in the last decades, the important role of non-financial measures and 
flexible benchmarks has been recognized (Otley, 2007). Appropriate PMS are now seen as 
systems incorporating relatively few measures and non-financial leading indicators, applying 
the measures consistently, and compensating people according to those measures for which 
they are responsible (Meyer, 2007). Nevertheless, Meyer (2007) points out that currently used 
PMS differ from this ideal concept and are affected by a number of drawbacks. One of them 
is the difficulty of compensating people for their efforts, since aggregating multiple measures 
into an overall one may cause different problems. On the one side, a formula-based 
aggregation may produce game-playing behaviors; on the other side, a subjective evaluation 
may generate unfairness perception and impede the understanding of the results (Burney et 
al., 2009; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Ittner et al., 2003; Meyer, 2007). 
One performance measurement instrument especially dealing with this aggregation issue is 
DEA, a non-parametric approach to determine overall (relative) efficiency scores for DMUs 
based on financial and non-financial performance criteria. The idea of DEA is to calculate the 
relative efficiency of n DMUs on the basis of m weighted inputs and s weighted outputs, 
which serve as performance criteria. For each DMUo of the set of DMUs, a mathematical 
programming model maximizes its efficiency score θo, ranging from 0% to 100%. Thereby, 
the weights for the inputs and outputs are endogenously determined for each DMUo, with the 
consequence that weights are not constant over the DMUs in order to present each of them in 
its best possible light. Furthermore, the method allows the analyst to identify benchmarks for 
inefficient DMUs as well as slacks, defined as non-radial (additional) input excesses and/or 
output shortfalls (for an overview of DEA, see, e.g., Cook & Seiford, 2009; Cooper et al., 
2007; Thanassoulis, 2001).  
When applying DEA, the decision maker needs to build a performance evaluation framework, 
i.e., to determine the set of DMUs to be evaluated, the performance criteria to be used and the 
specific DEA model to be applied. Once these parameters have been specified and the 
mathematical calculation has been carried out, the DEA results should be interpreted and 
checked for plausibility. The framework building phase and the interpretation phase involve 
different cognitive tasks, such as choice and estimation.  
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Original DEA models were developed for measuring efficiency and took no major account of 
the preferences of decision makers in this process. This was criticized, since a DMU, e.g., can 
be classified as strong efficient even if it is just attaining a superior performance on only one 
criterion (Ahn et al., 2012; Wallenius et al., 2008). Different concepts have been proposed for 
including value judgments in DEA, but none of them has applied a behavioral approach. In 
fact, research in DEA has only concentrated on pitfalls from a normative and rational 
perspective (see, e.g., Dyson et al. 2001). The only exception so far is the paper by Zha et al. 
(2013), which proposes a halo heuristic to solve the problem of missing data. 
 
2.2 Behavioral research on subjective performance evaluation: a brief review 
Previous research dealing with subjective performance evaluation from a behavioral 
perspective has mainly concentrated on the use of unique and common performance measures 
in the context of balanced scorecards (BSC) as well as on the influence of strategy maps and 
the presentation format on performance judgments. A review of the three main accounting 
journals publishing articles on the topic of behavioral performance evaluation (Journal of 
Accounting Research, The Accounting Review and Accounting, Organizations and Society) 
permits us to identify ten highly influential articles in the period 1998–2012 dealing with 
management control topics. Seven out of the ten articles concentrate on performance 
evaluation, with a strong focus on BSC. The remaining three articles deal with the effect of 
control systems on trust, collaboration, norms and organizational change (Chenhall & Euske, 
2007; Coletti et al., 2005; Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011). The contributions treating 
performance evaluation issues will be briefly described in the following. 
The experiment conducted by Lipe & Salterio (2000) is the first to document cognitive 
limitations associated to the use of BSC as an instrument for performance evaluation. Their 
results suggest that (i) unit managers’ decisions will be more influenced by common measures 
than by unique measures designed for a particular business unit and (ii) evaluators will 
underweight non-financial and leading measures, thus reducing the benefits offered by the 
implementation of a BSC. In the same research direction, Banker et al. (2004) evaluate the 
role played by information on strategic linkages. They confirm the common measures bias 
and also find that strategically linked measures dominate common measures only in the case 
that managers understand the unit’s strategy. Libby et al. (2004) provide other debiasing 
alternatives for the common measures bias. Building on prior research in performance 
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evaluation and consumer behavior, the authors find that requiring managers to justify their 
performance evaluation (accountability) and augmenting the reliability of the measures 
increase the use of unique measures.  
Contrary to the psychology-oriented research originated from the paper of Lipe & Salterio 
(2000), Banker et al. (2000) deal with performance evaluation from an economic perspective. 
They conclude that customer-related non-financial measures are associated with long-term 
financial performance. They also show that (financial and non-financial) performance 
improves after including non-financial measures in the incentive contract. Ittner et al. (2003) 
integrate the psychological and the economic perspectives in their study of subjectivity 
weighting of multiple performance measures. The authors conclude that their results are more 
consistent with psychology-based theories predicting an “outcome effect” – i.e., more weight 
will be placed on outcome measures (external measures, e.g. financial and customer 
measures) than on driver measures (internal measures, e.g., process improvement, employee 
satisfaction). Further, they find that people tend to assign more weight to “known” outcome 
measures than to “new” ones, confirming that other factors besides informativeness influence 
performance evaluation. 
The remaining two articles deal with PMS characteristics and their effects on performance, 
thus extending their conclusions to other systems beyond the BSC. Hall (2008) shows that a 
comprehensive PMS has an indirect effect on managerial performance mediated by role 
clarity and psychological empowerment. Burney et al. (2009) analyze other mediating 
variables for the effect of PMS on performance. They find that the perception of two PMS 
characteristics – the PMS is technically valid and it reflects a strategic causal model – 
positively influence both distributive and procedural justice perceptions. The authors also 
show that procedural justice perception alters organizational citizenship behaviors, which in 
turns affects performance. As conclusion, they suggest that clearly communicating the 
characteristics of the PMS could avoid problems associated with formulaic incentive plans.  
A thorough understanding of the possible biases and the corresponding debiasing mechanisms 
are of special importance for the design and implementation of adequate PMS (Cheng & 
Humphreys, 2012). The DEA approach, as a comprehensive measure of performance, 
becomes a more and more integrated part of such systems (Epstein & Henderson, 1989). 
Therefore, its cognitive effects should be considered. While there may be undesirable 
consequences of incorporating DEA results into performance reports, the paper concentrates 
on a desirable consequence, namely its role as a debiasing procedure for the decoy effect.  
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2.3 The decoy effect in choice tasks 
Normative choice models are based on the assumption that the preference between two 
options is independent of the presence or absence of a third option, i.e., they satisfy the axiom 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (Eisenführ et al., 2010; Tversky & Simonson, 
1993). Therefore, the probability of choosing one of two efficient alternatives a and b should 
not increase when an inefficient – i.e. dominated – alternative c is added to the original data 
set (condition of regularity). Formally, given A = {a, b} and B = {a, b, c}, the following 
inequalities for the probabilities should hold: P (a; A) ≥ P (a; B) and P (b; A) ≥ P (b; B) 
(Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Huber et al., 1982). Despite appearing to be an intuitive principle, 
experimental research in judgment and decision making has shown that this axiom can be 
violated by adding a new option (decoy) to the set of alternatives. Such a decoy alters the 
preferences of the decision maker, increasing the attractiveness of the dominating or near-
dominating alternative (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). This 
phenomenon, known as the decoy effect, is a case of local context-dependent preferences 
(Tversky & Simonson, 1993).  
The first type of decoy to be studied was the asymmetrically dominated decoy, which refers to 
an alternative that is dominated by another one (target) but not by the rest. Huber et al. (1982) 
identify three different kinds of asymmetrically dominated decoys according to their position 
relative to the target: (i) range decoys (R), which increase the range of the weak dimension of 
the target, (ii) frequency decoys (F), which increase the number of alternatives on the strong 
dimension of the target, and (iii) range-frequency decoys (RF), a combination of both. All of 
them have been shown to affect choice, but the RF decoys evidence the weakest effect. A 
reason for this may be found in the difficulty of recognizing the dominance. In Fig. 1, there 
are two alternatives (a and b) with the same level of utility but different performance on the 
two dimensions. For a as the target option and b its competitor, a Ra decoy will increase the 
covered range on the weak dimension of a (for this dimension 1, the original range d1b – d1a 
will be extended to d1b – d1Ra.), thus decreasing the importance of the difference on this 
dimension. The Fa decoy, on the contrary, will augment the weight of the dimension on which 
a is superior (dimension 2) by reducing the variance on that dimension, thus increasing the 
perceived distance between the two extremes (a and b). Finally, the combined RFa decoy will 
increase the range on dimension 1 and reduce the variance in dimension 2 (Huber et al., 1982; 
Wedell & Pettibone, 1996).  
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Fig. 1. Location of the different types of decoys (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996) 
Besides these decoys, not asymmetrically dominated decoys exist: the range symmetrical 
decoys (RS) and the non-dominated decoys. RS decoys extend the weak dimension of the 
target item but are symmetrically dominated by the target and the competitor. Non-dominated 
decoys include (i) the inferior decoy (I), which is similar to R but with a higher value than the 
target on one dimension, (ii) the compromise decoy (C), which is located close to the 
indifference curve defined by the dominating alternatives, and (iii) the phantom decoy (P), a 
decoy that dominates all alternatives but cannot be selected. In Fig. 1, the Ia decoy also 
extends the range of the dimension on which a is weak, but Ia is not strictly dominated by a as 
it has a higher value than the target on dimension 2. The Ca decoy has the same level of utility 
as options a and b, but it makes the target alternative a appear as a compromise between the 
two extreme items Ca and b. The Pa decoy differs from all others as it dominates the target 
option without being eligible itself; it corresponds to the “sold out” product or the candidate 
who has already signed a contract with another company (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). 
Ariely (2009) suggests that the decoy effect occurs because the decision maker cannot easily 
evaluate the trade-offs necessary to choose between the two superior alternatives. The 
introduction of a dominated alternative permits the decision maker to reduce the cognitive 
load by creating a simple relative comparison between the decoy and the target. For further 
information about the different models proposed for explaining the decoy effect (weight 
change, value shift, and value added), see, e.g., Wedell & Pettibone (1996).  
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Research on the decoy effect for the case of choice tasks has mainly concentrated on the 
analysis of three alternatives (two options and a decoy) defined in only two dimensions. 
Huber et al. (1982) suggest that increasing the complexity of the task – by augmenting the 
number of alternatives or attributes – could limit the decoy effect as the dominated alternative 
might not easily been recognized. Simonson (1989) argues that increasing complexity and 
realism would reduce transparency, hence producing more decisional errors. An extension of 
the results to a multidimensional space is offered by Ariely & Wallsten (1995), who conclude 
that decision makers assign a higher weight to those dimensions that help discriminating 
among alternatives. 
The decoy effect appears to be robust and has been identified in several choice domains, 
including consumer behavior and personnel selection. Different manipulations have been 
proposed to weaken this bias, but not all of them have satisfactorily reduced or eliminated it 
(Slaughter et al., 2011). One of the first studies dealing with this topic was the experiment 
conducted by Simonson (1989). He examines the influence of making participants 
accountable for their decisions on the decoy effect and finds that instead of reducing or 
eliminating the effect, accountability aggravates it. Recently, Connolly et al. (2013) test the 
impact of making participants think about the regret they might experience if they make a 
wrong decision (regret priming) on the decoy effect and conclude that it is a useful debiasing 
tool. Hamilton et al. (2007) find that incorporating fully dominated options to a set can cause 
the opposite reaction than the decoy effect does. The authors explain this effect as a 
consequence of grouping those alternatives with a repeated common attribute value and 
focusing on the only alternative with a unique value. 
Previous research studying the decoy effect in performance judgments is very limited, with 
the consequence that issues such as the influence of decoys on performance ratings remain 
unexplained (Reb et al., 2014). In the area of individual performance assessment, Highhouse 
(1996) analyzes the effects of decoy alternatives in a simulated employee selection context 
and finds that rank-ordering of candidates depends on the presence of irrelevant alternatives. 
In a more recent study, Slaughter et al. (2006) confirm this conclusion in the context of a 
group-based decision and corroborate the strengthening effect that accountability has on the 
decoy effect. These common attempts to investigate the decoy effect strongly resemble the 
relative performance evaluation settings where DEA can be applied. Consequently, it seems 
worth investigating the decoy effect in this context.  
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3 Hypotheses and predictions 
The present study investigates (i) the existence of the decoy effect in a hypothetical setting of 
relative performance evaluation and (ii) the potential of the DEA approach to reduce this 
effect. Thanks to the comment of a reviewer, it should be clarified here that both scenarios 
address utility determination, while scenario (ii) also deals with (DEA) efficiency 
determination. Utility determination and efficiency determination can be understood as two 
different evaluation levels which are hierarchically connected via the relevant inputs and 
outputs and the assumptions made in a specific evaluation case (Dyckhoff, 2006). In order to 
find attractive units, DEA forms a production frontier which represents the efficient input-
output combinations based on a certain set of assumptions; with further preferences of the 
evaluator concerning the inputs and outputs, a utility function allows the decision maker to 
select among these efficient input-output combinations. From this hierarchical point of view, 
the evaluation of alternatives depends on the structure of the efficient frontier and further 
preferences which shape the utility function. 
In our study, scenario (i) focuses on the utility evaluation level in order to investigate the 
decoy effect. By providing additional information about DEA results in scenario (ii), also the 
efficiency evaluation level is addressed. In both scenarios, the decision makers choose upon 
their individual set of (implicit) preferences needed to evaluate utility. Only in the second 
scenario, they additionally have access to (explicit) information about efficiency measures.  
With respect to the first part of our study, we expect that decision makers evaluating the 
performance of different subsidiaries on a relative basis will behave in an analogous manner 
to consumers in a choice context. This means that they will favor the target subsidiary when a 
decoy is included in the set of options. Replicating previous experimental research, we 
present a case describing the performance of two superior subsidiaries and an asymmetrically 
dominated one by means of four attributes. Our first hypothesis can be summarized as 
follows: 
H1a: The preference for the target subsidiary as the best performing DMU will 
increase when an RF decoy is included in the choice set. 
H1b: The preference for the target subsidiary as the best performing DMU will 
increase when an R decoy is included in the choice set. 
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According to Ariely (2009), the presence of a decoy simplifies the comparison among 
alternatives by focusing attention on the decoy and the target options. In the second part of 
our study, we strive for avoiding such a misleading simplification on the utility evaluation 
level by making the evaluators aware of information on the efficiency evaluation level. In 
particular, we provide DEA efficiency scores and non-zero slacks which characterize the 
superior alternatives as (DEA-)efficient DMUs, while dominated decoys are characterized as 
weak efficient or inefficient DMUs. Thereby, we strive to prove that the undesired decoy 
effect can be reduced, since evaluators are expected to eliminate non-efficient DMUs from 
further analysis, thus limiting the set of relevant DMUs just to the superior alternatives. This 
can be summarized as: 
H2a: The presence of DEA efficiency scores differentiating between efficient and 
inefficient DMUs will reduce the decoy effect. 
H2b: The mention of non-zero slacks differentiating between strong efficient and 
weak efficient DMUs will reduce the decoy effect. 
Hypothesis H2a will be evaluated for the case in which RF decoys are added to the DMU set, 
hypothesis H2b for the case containing R decoys. The decision to consider these decoys and 
not others originates in previous results suggesting that RF decoys have the weakest effect, 
while R decoys have the strongest one (Huber et al., 1982; Wedell & Pettibone, 1996). 
 
4 Method 
4.1 Participants and design  
Bachelor students (N = 482 taking introductory management control and business accounting 
courses at a German university received a performance report during a lecture. Eight 
participants did not complete the task and their questionnaires were therefore eliminated from 
further analysis. The basic design variables were: (i) decoy type (R or RF), (ii) decoy target (a 
or b), and (iii) DEA analysis (with or without DEA results). Students were randomly assigned 
to the different treatments and control conditions, the latter were included for testing that the 
set of non-dominated alternatives were considered to have approximately the same utility 
level. Two different control conditions were considered, one containing DEA efficiency 
scores and one without any kind of performance aggregation measure. A total of ten different 
groups were analyzed (see Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Sample size of the different treatments 
Conditions Without DEA results With DEA results 
 DMUs N DMUs N 
   Efficiency scores 
Control condition a, b  57 a, b  53 
RF-decoy a, b , RFa 53 a, b , RFa 56 
 a, b , RFb 54 a, b , RFb 51 
  Efficiency scores and slacks 
R-decoy a, b , Ra 38 a, b , Ra 34 
 a, b , Rb 37 a, b , Rb 41  
 
4.2 Case materials 
A short vignette presenting the hypothetical case of a delivery chain with two/three 
subsidiaries was presented. The participants were required to assume the role of the central 
management and to decide which of these subsidiaries deserves a bonus based on the available 
performance criteria. All participants received a table containing the data of two criteria to be 
minimized and two criteria to be maximized for each of the subsidiaries. The DEA conditions 
also included a brief description of the method and the corresponding DEA efficiency results. 
For the treatments with RF decoys, only the DEA efficiency scores were included in the 
report as they are sufficient for discriminating between efficient and inefficient DMUs. For 
the treatments with R decoys, the existence of slacks was also mentioned since the efficiency 
scores could not be used as a discriminating cue. The vignette text presented in the appendix 
shows that the experiment was kept as simple as possible, following the premise that 
experimental research should reduce complexity in order to avoid that side effects or 
additional concerns influence the results. Especially, it was not discussed which DEA model 
should be chosen. Instead, the basic CRS model served as a first example to support our 
hypothesis that DEA efficiency scores can act as a debiasing procedure for the decoy effect. 
The VRS model could have also been applied in this case as it leads to the same classification 
of the DMUs into efficient, weak efficient and inefficient ones. Nevertheless, further research 
investigating the effects of using the scores of other DEA models should be conducted. 
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The attribute values of the superior DMUs were selected so that in the control case both 
alternatives are preferred by about half of the participants (Connolly et al., 2013). For 
evaluating whether the alternatives a and b were perceived as indifferent by the decision 
makers, a pretest was conducted (N = 78 high school students), with the result that 54% of the 
participants preferred alternative a over b. R decoys for a (Ra) and for b (Rb) were constructed 
based on the procedure presented by Wedell & Pettibone (1996), but adapting it for a task 
with four attributes instead of two. The decoys were obtained by separating the total space in 
two subspaces (one to be minimized and one to be maximized) and applying the construction 
rule in each of the two subspaces. For the construction of the RF decoys, a small modification 
was required since otherwise RF decoys for a (RFa) and b (RFb) would have had different 
DEA efficiency scores and a considerable improvement potential (RFa = (52; 45; 155; 100), 
efficiency score = 67%; RFb = (34; 65; 85; 168), efficiency score = 71%). Therefore, RFa and 
RFb were created by changing the original values in less than 10% in order to obtain almost 
efficient decoys with the same efficiency scores. Extremely inefficient DMUs may be 
immediately disregarded, thus transforming the decision task in an analogous case to the 
control condition. Table 2 presents the values corresponding to each of the performance 
criteria for the two superior DMUs and each of the decoys.  
Table 2 
Data for the experiments 
Performance criteria a b Ra Rb RFa RFb 
To be minimized       
Number of call-center employees  
(monthly average) 
43 25 52 25 45 27 
Number of complains  
(daily average) 
34 56 34 65 37 59 
To be maximized       
Processed purchase orders of clothing articles 
(hourly average) 
190 120 190 85 186 119 
Processed purchase orders of household 
articles (hourly average) 
134 202 100 202 127 198 
Efficiency score 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 96% 
Slacks ≠ 0 no no yes yes n.a. n.a. 
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4.3 Procedure 
The participants were informed that the aim of the study was to capture the different 
responses to a performance assessment case from a descriptive point of view, implying that 
there was no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer. Subjects received a paper-based version of the 
vignette corresponding to the treatment they had been randomly assigned to. They were asked 
to complete the questionnaire in approximately five minutes and under final exam conditions, 
with the difference that anonymity was guaranteed. No questions requiring them to justify 
their decision were included since augmenting accountability has been shown to intensify the 
decoy effect (Connolly et al., 2013; Simonson, 1989). 
Participants in the control condition received a binary choice set represented as a 4 × 2 matrix. 
The choice set corresponding to the control condition including DEA efficiency scores was 
represented as a 5 × 2 matrix. Participants in the other treatments were provided with a trinary 
choice set. In the treatments without efficiency scores, the performance data was arranged in a 
4 × 3 matrix. When RF decoys were added, the superior DMUs were strong efficient and the 
decoy was inefficient. In this case, only the efficiency scores were added to the original 
matrix (5 × 3 matrix). In the treatments including R decoys, all three DMUs were efficient, 
but the decoy was just weak efficient. To be able to discriminate between them, information 
regarding slacks was added (6 × 3 matrix).  
Previous research has shown that a sequential presentation of alternatives affects the way they 
are evaluated (Damisch et al., 2006; Page & Page, 2010). Consequently, the data corresponding 
to each DMU was randomized to avoid undesired biases related to the presentation order.  
 
5 Results 
Consistent with previous research, the results show that the inclusion of a decoy in a 
performance evaluation context increments the proportion of participants preferring the target 
alternative. As shown in Fig. 2, approximately 60% of the participants in the two control 
conditions chose DMU a as the best performing DMU. This proportion increased when an 
inferior alternative similar to a was included in the report and decreased when the inferior 
option was similar to b. The decoy effect shrank when DEA results (efficiency score in the 
case of RF decoys; efficiency score and information about the slacks in the case of R decoys) 
were presented. The next sections report the statistical results for the two research hypothesis 
of these experiments.  
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Fig. 2. Proportion of participants choosing DMU a as the best performing DMU in the different treatments 
 
5.1 The decoy effect in a performance evaluation context 
The first purpose of our study was to prove the existence of a decoy effect in an assumed 
performance evaluation context. The hypothesis was that both, an RF decoy as well as an R 
decoy would influence the preferences of the performance evaluator. Table 3 summarizes the 
results for the treatments including both kinds of decoys and the control case when no DEA 
results were provided. In the control case, 61% of the participants chose subsidiary a over 
subsidiary b. This proportion is similar to the one suggested in the study of Wedell & 
Pettibone (1996). A test for binomial distribution can be used for determining whether the 
percentage of subjects choosing one of the options is significantly higher than 50%. In the 
control case, there is no evidence to conclude that any of the two alternatives is more 
preferred than the other one (p-value = 0.111).  
As in other relevant previous studies (e.g., Huber et al., 1982; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000), a 
minor number of participants chose the inferior alternative. Even if this has been shown to be 
a common behavior (see, e.g., Russo et al., 2006, for some recent research on this topic), the 
following tests will adjust to the existing literature and therefore be based only on the cases in 
which the decoy was not chosen. In Table 3, the sample size excluding the choices for the 
decoy and the corresponding proportions for alternatives a and b are presented in parentheses. 
Target DMU a Target DMU b 
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Table 3 
Preferences in the treatments without DEA results 
DMU set N a b Decoy 
a, b 57 0.614 0.386  
a, b, RFa 53 
(51) 
0.755 
(0.784) 
0.208 
(0.216) 
0.038 
a, b, RFb 54 
(51) 
0.481 
(0.510) 
0.463 
(0.490) 
0.056 
 
a, b, Ra 38 
(36) 
0.711 
(0.750) 
0.237 
(0.250) 
0.053 
a, b, Rb 37 
(34) 
0.324 
(0.353) 
0.595 
(0.647) 
0.081 
Simonson (1989) notes that a decoy effect exists if the proportion of participants preferring 
DMU a in both treatments (one with target DMU a and the other with target DMU b) 
significantly differs. In our case, a corresponding effect can be observed for both kind of 
decoys by means of a χ² test for difference of proportions as well as a Fisher exact test for 
independence of categorical data (Ra vs. Rb: H0: P(a)Ra = P(a)Rb; χ² = 11.173, p-value = 0.001, 
Fisher exact test p-value = 0.002; RFa vs. RFb: H0: P(a)RFa = P(a)RFb; χ² = 8.414, p-value = 
0.004, Fisher exact test p-value = 0.007). In a similar manner, if a decoy effect exists, the 
percentage of subjects choosing the target alternative is significantly larger than 50%. 
Connolly et al. (2013) note that this proportion could vary if one of the options is more 
popular than the other; nevertheless, they explicitly desist from modifying this parameter as it 
would not affect their conclusions but would add further complexity to the hypothesis testing. 
Accordingly, and since we could not find any evidence that the proportion of subjects 
choosing a in the control condition is significantly different from 0.50, we also applied an 
exact binomial test with P = 0.50. The results of this test confirm the existence of a decoy 
effect in the hypothetical performance evaluation context used in our experiment (R decoy: 
H0: P(a)R = 0.50; p-value = 0.001; RF decoy: H0: P(a)RF = 0.50; p-value = 0.007).  
The addition of the R and RF decoys significantly altered the preferences of the evaluators. 
These experimental results suggest that performance evaluation is likely to be affected by the 
decoy effect. 
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5.2 Using DEA as a debiasing mechanism 
The decoy effect in performance evaluation is problematic not only regarding the fairness of 
the appraisal, but also with respect to strategic consequences. When two DMUs are attaining a 
superior performance, but they are not easily comparable, the inclusion of a third DMU with a 
lower performance appears to be critical for the decision of which DMU should be presented 
as a benchmark for all others. The second purpose of our study is to evaluate whether this 
issue may be avoided by incorporating an overall performance measure that highlights the 
difference among strong efficient, weak efficient and inefficient DMUs. This debiasing 
mechanism is expected to focus decision maker’s attention on the two strong efficient DMUs, 
thus avoiding the effect of the decoy alternative on the choice. The experimental results 
presented in Table 4 support this idea. 
Table 4 
Preferences in the treatments with DEA results 
DMU set N a b Decoy 
a, b 53 0.585 0.415  
a, b, RFa 56 
(53) 
0.661 
(0.698) 
0.286 
(0.302) 
0.054 
a, b, RFb 51 
(49) 
0.490 
(0.510) 
0.471 
(0.490) 
0.039 
 
a, b, Ra 34 
(30) 
0.529 
(0.600) 
0.353 
(0.400) 
0.118 
a, b, Rb 41 
(37) 
0.488 
(0.541) 
0.415 
(0.459) 
0.098 
The control condition including DEA efficiency scores can be assumed to follow a binomial 
distribution (H0: P(a) = 0.50; exact binomial test p-value = 0.272). Further, a comparison 
between the results for both control conditions shows that reporting DEA efficiency scores 
and briefly explaining the DEA methodology does not affect preferences (H0: P(a) Control No DEA 
= P(a)Control DEA; χ² = 0.097, p-value = 0.755, Fisher exact test p-value = 0.846). Therefore, 
increasing of the amount of information provided to the respondents does not appear to be the 
reason for the preference changes described in the following paragraphs.  
 
DEA efficiency scores differentiating between efficient and inefficient DMUs. This part of 
the analysis concentrates on the treatments including RF decoys, which correspond to 
inefficient DMUs. Reporting DEA efficiency scores that divide DMUs into efficient and 
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inefficient ones seems to act as a debiasing procedure for reducing the decoy effect. 
According to a χ² test for difference of proportions and a Fisher exact test, the proportion of 
participants choosing DMU a in both treatments did not significantly differ when efficiency 
scores were reported (H0: P(a)RFa DEA = P(a)RFb DEA, χ² = 3.772, p-value = 0.052, Fisher exact 
test p-value = 0.068; exact binomial test p-value = 0.059). This reveals the potential of 
efficiency scores to avoid the decoy effect. However, this result should be taken with caution 
and calls for re-examining experiments, as the p-values are close to 0.05. 
 
DEA efficiency scores and information about slacks, differentiating between efficient 
and weak efficient DMUs. Additional information about the existence of non-zero slacks to 
differentiate among strong efficient and weak efficient DMUs also contributed to reducing the 
decoy effect (H0: P(a)Ra DEA = P(a)Rb DEA, χ² = 0.239, p-value = 0.625, Fisher exact test p-
value = 0.804; exact binomial test p-value = 0.807).  
Nevertheless, a closer consideration of the data reported in Table 4 posits one question 
regarding the relative high percentage of participants preferring the decoys as the best 
performing DMUs. Previous research has documented that some participants erroneously 
choose the decoy as the best alternative (Huber et al., 1982; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). 
Furthermore, Russo et al. (2006) suggest that initially providing information supporting an 
inferior alternative leads people to consider this option as the leading one and to prefer it in a 
choice task.  
This violation to rational decision making may be due to a misunderstanding of the meaning 
of the non-zero slacks that might be originated in the formulation used to explain the role of 
the slacks in a DEA-based performance evaluation. This definition was stated in negative 
terms indicating that a DMU with slacks is not completely efficient. The vignette included the 
following formulation: ‘Additionally, DEA offers the possibility of identifying slacks. If a 
subsidiary has at least one slack ≠ 0, then this subsidiary is not completely efficient (even if it 
has a DEA efficiency score = 100%)’. Labeling the attributes in a positive or a negative manner 
is one way of modifying the presentation format, thus affecting the judgment of the attributes 
(Levin et al., 1998). Negative formulations are related to the word ‘no’, which acquires its 
significance associated to punishment, producing a negative affective value (Alia-Klein et al., 
2007). Furthermore, negative sentences usually describe deviations from expectations (Kaup 
et al., 2006) and cognitive processing of negations is more complex, requires more time, and 
leads to more decision errors (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Schul, 2011). Therefore, a DMU 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201902080959-0
19 
 
with a ‘no’ in the slacks dimension could have been erroneously perceived as a low 
performer, while the inferior alternative could have been assumed to be the leading one.  
 
5.3 Supplemental analysis 
Based on the framing literature and previous research on negation, an additional experiment 
was conducted to evaluate whether the negative explanation of the slacks was the reason for 
the unexpected results obtained in the previous section. The role of the slacks was formulated 
in a positive manner not only in the verbal description but also in the table containing the 
performance criteria. The vignette included the following formulation: ‘Additionally, DEA 
offers the possibility of identifying slacks. Only the subsidiaries that have all slacks = 0 are 
completely efficient, as no additional improvement has been identified.’ 
The results of this manipulation (see Table 5; N = 57 bachelor students) confirm that the 
decoy effect is eliminated by reporting the DEA efficiency scores and mentioning the 
presence of slacks (H0: P(a)Ra = P(a)Rb; χ² = 0.827, p-value = 0.363, Fisher exact test p-value 
= 0.542; exact binomial test p-value = 0.392). Nevertheless, it does not help to dissuade 
participants of choosing the inferior alternative. 
Table 5 
Preference in the treatments with a positive formulation concerning the slacks 
DMU set N a b Decoy 
a, b, Ra 29 
(26) 
0.655 
(0.731) 
0.241 
(0.269) 
0.103 
a, b, Rb 28 
(23) 
0.500 
(0.609) 
0.321 
(0.391) 
0.179 
A possible explanation for this behavior is based on the experimental results of Ha et al. 
(2009). They find that categorical attributes may mitigate the decoy effect by two different 
mechanisms: (i) editing and (ii) hierarchical elimination of options. Editing strategies permit 
the decision maker to simplify choice problems by means of dismissal of dominated options 
and cancellation of shared or redundant attributes. Hierarchical elimination is based on a 
previous categorization of alternatives based on salient features, allowing the elimination of 
alternatives belonging to a category without considering the other attributes. This process is 
more likely to be applied in cases that the decision maker has a strong preference for one 
category over the other. 
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We expected that the mention of existing slacks would make participants categorize the three 
alternatives into two groups: strong efficient and weak efficient DMUs. Since strong efficient 
should be preferred over weak efficient DMUs, participants should have dismissed the 
dominated alternative (weak efficient DMU), concentrating their attention on the two superior 
alternatives. This seems to be true for most of the participants, but not for all of them. Other 
participants may have conducted first a within-group comparison for the strong efficient 
DMUs and afterwards a comparison against the weak efficient DMU (Ha et al., 2009). If the 
comparison between a and b indicates that a is the best, participants may have eliminated 
DMU b for further analysis. In this case, Rb is not dominated anymore, therefore appearing as 
a rational solution for the choice between a and Rb. On the contrary, if the comparison 
between a and b finalizes with the elimination of a, the decision maker would need to choose 
between b and Rb. As Rb is dominated by b, participants may have chosen b as the superior 
alternative, consistent with the decoy effect. 
 
6 Discussion 
The present study offers an analysis of the decoy effect in a performance evaluation context, 
focusing on the debiasing characteristics of DEA results. The traditional experimental setting 
commonly used in consumer behavior was slightly modified with the aim of adapting it to a 
relative performance evaluation case. To the best of our knowledge, it constitutes the first 
attempt to link the DEA approach to the decoy effect. The results of the experiments can be 
summarized as follows: 
• The first scenario (i) focused on the utility evaluation level. As has been shown, the 
utility comparison of the alternatives a and b was biased by the decoy effect. 
• In the second scenario (ii), also the efficiency evaluation level was addressed by 
providing additional information about DEA results. As a consequence, the decision 
makers change their evaluation on the utility level towards a significant reduction of the 
decoy effect.  
In detail, the first experiment considered the R and RF decoy, which significantly influenced 
the decision made by the evaluators. When the decoys were added to the DMU set, the 
proportion of participants considering the target DMU as the best performing DMU 
significantly increased. This can raise managerial issues not only regarding the fairness of the 
appraisal, but also about its strategic consequences, especially due to its influence on the 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201902080959-0
21 
 
selection of benchmarks (Page & Page 2010). According to Simonson (1989), demands for 
justification may strengthen the decoy effect, thus not serving as a debiasing tool. Therefore, 
this effect is expected to be even stronger in real performance evaluations than in the 
experimental conditions, since the central management will usually provide feedback to the 
DMU managers to justify its judgments.  
Our second main result indicates that reporting DEA efficiency scores that differentiate 
among efficient and inefficient DMUs seems to act as a debiasing procedure for the decoy 
effect. Adding an RF decoy accompanied by the corresponding scores contributed to reducing 
the proportion of participants declaring the target DMU as the best performing subsidiary. 
The results regarding the adequacy of mentioning the existence of non-zero slacks as a 
debiasing procedure were contradictory. Despite no evidence for a decoy effect is found, an 
unanticipated effect is observed since the proportion of participants choosing the dominated 
alternative as the superior one. This suggests that the meaning of non-zero slacks may have 
been misunderstood, probably as a consequence of the formulation used to explain the role of 
the slacks. To this respect, research on negation has shown that cognitive processing of 
negations is more complex, slower and causes more decision errors (Hasson & Glucksberg, 
2006; Schul, 2011). An additional experiment was conducted to investigate whether the 
negative formulation of the slacks could have affected the interpretation of the performance 
criteria. The results indicate that a positive explanation of the slacks contribute to the 
elimination of the decoy effect, but not necessarily to the appropriate understanding of their 
meaning. As noted by one of the reviewers, these findings may have implications for the 
practical usage and the teaching of DEA. Similarly with the decoy effect, when DEA is 
illustrated by means of a simple 2-dimensional drawing, the localization of the inefficient 
observations in the illustration is likely to influence the viewer into favoring certain efficient 
DMUs. Therefore, further research tending to improve the correct utilization of slacks and 
other DEA results should be conducted. 
Our findings need to be interpreted in light of various limitations. A main criticism of our 
design may be that the results were obtained from a sample of bachelor students taking 
management control and business accounting introductory courses. This recourse to students 
as surrogates for managers has been supported by many authors (e.g., Holm & Rikhardsson, 
2008; Moore, 2005; Mortensen et al., 2012) and criticized by many others (e.g., Peterson, 
2001). Fuchs & Sarstedt (2010) suggest that, despite being theoretically discussed, the use of 
students in empirical marketing and management research has been widely accepted. 
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However, it is advisable to be cautious with generalizing our results, as the participants did 
not have previous experience with DEA and their knowledge of this approach was limited to 
the brief explanation included in the vignette. Nevertheless, our experience with 
implementing DEA in companies indicates that managers using DEA results for performance 
evaluations will also not have a much more comprehensive understanding of the approach. In 
this context, it seems interesting to investigate to what extent our results change if no 
explanation about DEA is provided. 
Further research needs to be conducted towards achieving an exhaustive understanding of 
behavioral performance evaluation and the possible debiasing role of DEA. For example, the 
addition of other kinds of decoys – such as phantom decoys, which correspond to unobserved 
DMUs in the DEA literature – and the occurrence of the compromise and attribute-balance 
effect should be analyzed. To this respect, the unit of measurement of the attributes is worth 
being considered. Furthermore, it is interesting whether a perceptual focus effect occurs when 
augmenting the number of inefficient or weak efficient DMUs with the same efficiency score. 
Finally, research dedicated to analyze visualization effects on the use and interpretation of 
DEA can provide genuine benefits to the field (Mortenson et al., 2015). 
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Appendix 
You are the manager of a delivery chain with three subsidiaries. The year is finishing and you 
have to decide which of these three subsidiaries deserves a bonus. Following information is 
available:  
Criteria to be minimized Criteria to be maximized 
(monthly average) 
Number of call-center employees 
(hourly average) 
Processed purchase orders of articles of clothing 
(daily average) 
Number of complains 
(hourly average) 
Processed purchase orders of household articles 
Additionally, you got from the management control department an evaluation that aggregates 
these four performance criteria into an overall performance score via data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). This instrument is briefly described below: 
Brief explanation of DEA 
Decide now (from your own point of view and based on the following data) which subsidiary 
deserves a bonus.  
Performance criteria Subsidiary A Subsidiary B Subsidiary C 
To be  
minimized 
Number of call-center  
employees 43 25 
D
ec
oy
 
Number of complains 34 56 
To be  
maximized 
Processed purchase orders  
of articles of clothing 190 120 
Processed purchase orders  
of household articles 134 202 
DEA-efficiency score 100% 100% 
Slacks ≠ 01 no no 
 
Response: Subsidiary ____2 
 
                                                          
1  This information as well as the last paragraph of the brief explanation of DEA regarding slacks were only 
included in the treatments corresponding to Ra and Rb with a DEA report. 
2  The text written in italics was included only in the treatments with DEA scores. The control case included 
only the data corresponding to DMUs a and b. The vignette was originally written in German. 
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